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Abstract

The 2010 explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig was an environmental disaster
unparalleled in United States history. Because of this, there has been a great deal of research
studies regarding the matter.
The purpose of this study was to determine what inshore fishing guides in the Tampa Bay
Area feel should be a response to future oil spills using Image Repair Theory, as well as how this
important group of stakeholders felt about the image repair responses employed by BP in the
wake of the spill.
In depth interviews were used to gather data and answer the pertinent research questions,
which also generated follow up questions. The findings showed Tampa Bay Area captains feel
that BP’s responses in the wake of the spill were inadequate in alleviating the situation. The
captains felt that better planning on the part of oil companies is needed and also that oil
companies should be mortified and have clear and decisive plans for correcting the situation as
well as alleviating the effects of said spill on the pertinent publics.
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CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction

Thesis Statement

The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of what inshore fishing guides in
Tampa Bay feel should be a response to oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico under the guise of Image
Repair Theory. Another purpose of this study was to gauge the captains’ perceptions and
responses/thoughts regarding the image repair strategies that were employed by BP following the
Deepwater Horizon spill. These goals were accomplished by conducting in depth interviews.
Of all the research that currently exists regarding the Deepwater Horizon spill, charter
fishing guides have not been represented at all. Charter captains can spend up to 300 days a year
on the water, while they don’t necessarily hold scientific knowledge; they are very in tune with
the happenings of the waters that they fish. The lack of representation this public has in the
current body of research is folly on the part of published social science researchers.
The study uses Image Repair Theory as a lens to examine the responses of the given
population; this theory has never been applied to this population before. The data that the
populations that are being examined provided the primary investigator with could conceptually
provide practical information to be referenced for future responses to such occurrences. Not only
could the findings be helpful to organizations in crisis (Image Repair Theory is practically a
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guide book for an organization in crisis), but it could also help bystanders impacted by the event
and in the case of an oil spill, the environment. The study didn’t make claims or hypotheses, it
didn’t aim to make any sort of broad changes; it merely provided information that was
previously unavailable. The responses to the research questions that the selected sample provided
could hold significant weight as guides are the eyes and ears on the water, therefor the results of
this study could conceptually help shape future public policy if policy makers were to reference
this study and decided to take this research and this public into account in the event of another oil
spill.
The population that was examined in this study is not only influential, but represents a
major part of Florida’s economy and identity. Florida is a peninsula; it is no secret that many
people make their livings on the water because of this. Even those who don’t work on the water
can be impacted by things that may happen to the water (fish kills, algae blooms, dangerous
wildlife, floods, etc.) many people also choose to spend leisure time on the water as well.
Florida was a state that was impacted in various ways by the Deepwater Horizon spill (which
was also the worst accidental spill ever in the U.S.). The actual population will be discussed in
more detail in the forthcoming sections.
In short, this study filled in a gap in the existing research regarding the Deepwater
Horizon spill by examining an underrepresented group of influential stakeholders which were
impacted by the event and BP’s associated responses. If policy makers were to read this study it
could help to shape future responses and strategies in the wake of oil spills because of the
influence of the effected publics and their take on the events (in depth discussion available in
results and discussion sections). The study did this under the guise of Image Repair Theory. All
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of the associated details with what was discussed in this first chapter can be found in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO:
Literature Review
Background
On April 20, 2010, the offshore oil rig, Deepwater Horizon exploded causing the largest
oil spill ever in U.S. waters. Federal officials estimated that over 84 days, more than 200 million
gallons or 4.9 million barrels of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico (Ramseur, 2010). The
spill affected more than 600 miles along the coasts of various states on the Gulf of Mexico,
including Florida, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas (Grattan et al., 2011). In the aftermath of the
spill, British Petroleum, who owned the rig, made use of many different tactics to clean up the oil
as well as to minimize the overall environmental damages. The physical response strategies are
listed as follows: it’s estimated that three percent was skimmed, five percent was burned, eight
percent was chemically dispersed, 16 percent was naturally dispersed, 17 percent was captured,
25 percent was evaporated or dissolved and 26 percent was remaining (Atlas & Hazen, 2011).
Skimming and burning were tactics employed in the 1993 oil spill that resulted from the freighter
Balsa 37 colliding with two inbound barge-tug combinations in Tampa’s main shipping channel
(Galt, LaBelle, McGrattan & Tennyson, 1994).While some of BP’s tactics had been used before
and were somewhat mainstream, the use of chemical dispersants proved to be a controversial
move. Another tactic that was also used with some degree of success in protecting coastal
shorelines was booms (Levy & Gopalakrishnan, 2010).
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The Deepwater Horizon will go down as one of the all-time worst environmental
disasters. In the end the total costs of the spill were unlike anything ever previously seen. Total
damages to BP, the environment and the U.S. Gulf Coast economy were estimated to be $36.9
billion (Smith, Smith, & Ashcroft, 2011). Not only was there enormous environmental and
economic damage, there were also deaths that resulted from the explosion. The explosion of the
instillation resulted in the deaths of 11 people (Liu, Weisberg, Hu & Zheng, 2011).
Image Repair Theory
Being responsible for an oil spill that dwarfed the infamous Exxon Valdez spill is
something that BP did not take lightly. BP employed a variety of image repair strategies to deal
with the public relations nightmare that the spill caused.
Image Repair Theory was developed by William Benoit to help understand how
organizations and individuals respond to crises, the theory is based around two key assumptions,
the first being that someone accuses an organization or individual as being responsible for a
particular action or situation, and the second is that the action in question is offensive or harmful
(Liu & Fraustino, 2014). A solidly constructed image has elements that enhance an organization
or individual's ability to project a perception of power, character, trust, leadership and name
recognition (Moody, 2011). Under Benoit’s Image Repair Theory, there are five primary
strategies: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action and
mortification (Compton, 2016). These five strategies will be discussed further in the measures
section.
Image Repair Theory can almost be thought of as a self-help manual or a roadmap back
to good standing for organizations facing crises. Throughout its development, Image Repair
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Theory has been used exclusively as a retrospective framework. This means that those who have
used the theory have applied it to understand particular cases of corporate communications by
looking back on what happened and why. This makes sense given the tenants that categorize the
theory itself. Sometimes, suggestions are also made about what could have been done better or
what generally can be done by others facing similar circumstances.” (Smudde & Courtright,
2008).
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon, BP’s strategies centered on describing and
delineating what they were doing to correct the problem and compensating the victims, but it did
not include strategies such as shifting the blame to the other parties nor did it include admitting
their own blame (Harlow, Brantley & Harlow, 2011).
Results of a content analysis showed that the use of corrective action was the
predominant image restoration strategy BP chose to use in their Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and
Flickr pages (Muralidharan, Dillistone & Shin, 2011). This echoed the findings presented by
Harlow and Brantley (2011). Specifically, in the Facebook posts that BP used, they focused on
information giving, letting the public know what was being done to fix the spill and trying to
generate positive comments and engagement from those affected by the spill. “Information
giving strategies dominated BP’s crisis response, and Facebook users were more likely to
comment favorably when BP used information giving strategies and accommodative strategies.
Bolstering strategies and third-party endorsement did not achieve anticipated effectiveness” (Lan
Ye & Eyun-Jung, 2017).
In regard to the payouts from the spill to those individuals and businesses impacted by
the spill BP paid out $20 billion to those impacted by the spill (Sole, 2011). The payouts and
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corrective actions associated with the spill was a major topic of discussion with the participants
of this study. Corrective action is a statement that expresses a commitment to repair the damage
from said offensive act. Corrective action can take two forms. The rhetorician can make a
promise to restore things to before the offensive act or they can promise to prevent any new
recurrences of the act” (Benoit, 2014) (P. 735).
There was a study conducted by Joy Smithson and Steven Venette (2013) that brought to
light an image repair strategy that had previously gone uncatalogued, specifically in BP’s
congressional testimonies. Analysis of the testimony revealed a previously unidentified imagedefense strategy, labeled here as stonewalling. This tactic redirected the audience’s attention to
miniscule and unimportant details, which enabled BP to temporarily prevent further damage to
the company’s image (Smithson & Venette, 2013).
In an article published earlier this year, entitled, The BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill:
Exploring the link between social and environmental disclosures and reputation risk
management present findings which Arora and Lodhia concur with the Smithson and Venette
study. “The company was engrossed in providing accounts of its world class facilities and
superior quality of management, diverting attention away from the severe environmental damage
caused by the massive oil spill” (Arora & Lodhia, 2017). While the article doesn’t detail
unimportant details that the Smithson and Venette study discussed, it does bring up that BP tried
to draw attention away from some aspects of the spill and to get people to focus on other things.
The article also supports Lan Ye and Eyun-Jung ‘s 2017 article which was previously mentioned
in the aspect that information giving was a huge part of BP’s response strategy.
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Uses of Image Repair Theory
There are abundant examples of Image Repair Theory being used during times of crisis; it
has been used by both individuals and organizations. One example was President Barack Obama
after the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and all of the issues associated with it. Having
accepted responsibility for these problems, the President’s defense proposed corrective action to
fix the situation. He declared that “problem number one [is] making sure that the website works
the way it's supposed to … [W]e’re working 24/7 to get it working for the vast majority of
Americans in a smooth, consistent way”. “My pledge to the American people is that we’re going
to solve the problems that are there, we’re going to get it right, and the Affordable Care Act is
going to work for the American people” (Benoit, 2014) (P. 735).
Another instance of Image Repair Theory being used successfully was in the case of
Duke Lacrosse. In 2006, members of the Duke men’s lacrosse team were accused of sexual
assault. Courts would eventually clear the players of all charges, but despite this, Duke had to
employ image repair strategies to protect their image. “Of these strategies, corrective action was
used the most. Initial corrective action messages concerned the lacrosse team and its forfeiture of
two games. Later, the university president announced the decision to suspend the season. Not
only was the president taking action by punishing the lacrosse players, but he also indicated that
the coach would be replaced. The clear implication was that a new coach may “correct” any
problems within the lacrosse team that the previous coach may have been responsible for”. (LenRíos, 2010) (P. 277).
In the introduction, the possibility of the results of this study being influential in future
policies was discussed. This study doesn’t directly aim to change any existing policies of
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governmental or non-governmental parties; conceptually if this study made it in front of the right
eyes it could be influential. The sexual assault cases at the United States Air Force Academy in
the early 2000s are an example of Image Repair Theory being used, with changes in policy that
went along with it as a result.
In January of 2003, female cadets began coming forward and contacting members of
Congress with reports of sexual assault and indifference from commanders, investigations would
reveal 142 allegations of sexual assault dating as far back as 1993 (Holtzhausen & Roberts,
2009). According to anonymous surveys regarding the climate of the academy (a standard
practice), cadets felt that there was a sexual assault problem at the academy and even 20 percent
of male cadets didn’t believe women belonged in the academy (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).
The Pentagon, Congress and Air Force brass had got involved and the entire situation was an
embarrassment to the Air Force.
In March 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force, a civilian appointed by the President of the
United States and charged with oversight of the entire U.S. Air Force, and the Chief of Staff, the
service’s highest ranking military officer, replaced the four top academy leaders and drew up
new institutional policies. They called it the “Agenda for Change,” and it addressed leadership,
cadet life and the broader academy climate (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009). Not only was there
corrective action of removing key individuals from positions of power at the academy, but there
was a policy change, the “Agenda for Change”.
This wasn’t the only time that image repair strategies resulted in policy changes. The
early 2000s also saw China in hot water, as their exports to countries around the world came
under scrutiny for being hazardous. Denial was a common image repair strategy utilized when it
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tried to diffuse criticisms. In the days following the US pet food recall, for instance, China
denied that grain protein products caused the spate of pet deaths. More criticisms followed
ranging from tires to toothpaste, from places ranging from the United States to New Zealand
(Peijuan, Pei & Pang, 2009).
China couldn’t deny everything or shift the blame forever; eventually they had to use
corrective action, which also included policy changes overall. At the national level, a four-month
campaign was launched to improve product and food safety. Through these measures, the
Chinese government promised that there would not be any uncertified producer by 2012.
Besides instituting massive reforms internally, China also established mechanisms with its
trading partners to ensure food safety (Peijuan, Pei & Pang, 2009).
There are many other examples of policy changes resulting from Image Repair Theory
and a crisis. The previously mentioned examples show how important Image Repair Theory can
be as it changed practices in the United States Air Force, a massive and powerful entity, and in
the country of China, a world power.
Philosophical Assumptions
Aside from Image Repair Theory, there are other factors that shaped the direction of this
study. The philosophical assumptions of the primary investigator helped to direct the path of how
the research was conducted. In this section, epistemology, ontology and axiology are defined and
the specific philosophical beliefs of the primary investigator are also discussed.
Ontology relates to the nature of reality and its characteristics, reality are multiple as seen
through many views. Epistemology entails researchers getting as close as possible to the
participants being studied. The researcher attempts to lessen the distance between themselves
10

and that being researched. Axiology involves the researcher bringing his own values into a study;
the researcher acknowledges that research is value laden and that biases are present (Cresswell,
2013).
Epistemology can also be thought of as the questions, “how do we know the world?” or
“what is the relationship between the inquirer and the known?” (Brennen, 2017). Ontology raises
basic questions about the nature of reality (Brennen, 2017).
The ontological perspective of the primary researcher was that the specific public that
was under investigation in this study could offer a unique perspective. Specifically, the primary
researcher felt that the reality of the given public as it pertains to the Deepwater Horizon incident
may be different than the reality of other groups and publics because they lived through it and
had it directly impact their lives.
Given that the primary investigator was driven by his ontological philosophical
perspective it lead to the belief on the part of the primary investigator that in depth interviews
were the best approach to collect the pertinent data. The group that was studied is
underrepresented in the current research, therefore, their reality may be unique and not one that
is currently known and understood. Interviews were the best way to discover this information.
Populations
The body of research regarding the Deepwater Horizon spill is extensive. There is a great
deal of scientific research papers discussing how everything from ocean sediments to plants and
animals were impacted by the spill – the biological implications. There are also a large number
of social science papers that discuss the human aspect of the spill. For example, a marketing
research company commissioned by the Louisiana Seafood Promotion Board reported that 70
11

percent of consumers polled expressed at least some level of concern about seafood safety
following the Gulf oil spill, and 23 percent had reduced their consumption of seafood during that
time. The study implied that consumer concerns with safety had caused a decrease in demand for
Gulf seafood and seafood in general (Upton, 2011). This phenomenon was supported by the
2016 study, Measuring the Impact of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Consumer
Behavior. According to the study, “the BP spill had a negative impact on oyster demand in terms
of short-run actual behavior, although spill effects show signs of dissipating several months
following the spill” (Morgan, Whitehead, Huth, Martin & Sjolander, 2016). Additionally, the
study also revealed that short and long term spill responses differed across consumer groups.
Aside from consumer behaviors, there is research on other stakeholders such as
commercial and recreational fisherman. The same 2011 study by Upton found that recreational
fishing also makes significant contributions to the region’s economy by supporting businesses
such as charters (guides), bait and tackle shops, restaurants and lodging. In 2008, 5.7 million
Gulf recreational fishermen, both visitors and residents, took 24 million fishing trips. In 2008,
recreational fishermen spent over $12.5 billion on durable equipment and trips in the Gulf
region.
In Florida, recreational saltwater fishing generates $7.6 billion dollars per year and
supports 109,341 jobs (Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 2014). From sales
of Florida fishing licenses alone, $35,528,631 in revenues was generated in fiscal year 2013/14
(Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 2016). It was because of this that this
population is so important. Recreational fishing has a huge impact on the state of Florida, and
this very specific group of stakeholders that hasn’t yet been studied. There were two research
questions in this survey:
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RQ1: How do the participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the aftermath of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill?
RQ2: What response strategies do participants feel should be used in future spills?
Through the gathering of empirical data, this study took the already extensive body of
research regarding the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in a new direction under the guise of Image
Repair Theory.
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CHAPTER THREE:
Method
Participants
Participants included 11 inshore charter fishing captains in the Tampa Bay Area spanning
from Dunedin and Clearwater to Tampa Bay. Participants were recruited via convenience
sampling; the primary investigator has been a part of the fishing industry for many years and had
ready access to the participants. The participants in question had over 100 years of experience as
guides and had been fishing recreationally for nearly their entire lives. In terms of demographics,
the participants were all white males that all spanned the age categories from 18 to 24 to over 55.
Procedure
The study was approved by the USF Institutional Review Board (IRB). The locations for
each interview were selected by coordinating with each subject to find a mutually agreeable
setting for the interview. Interview sites were evaluated by proximity to each party, comfort level
for each individual and seclusion/noise level in order to facilitate the best recording conditions.
Upon meeting at an agreed on location, before the interview commenced, there was small
talk between the primary investigator and the participants. The small talk served to relax the
subject and help them to feel comfortable; during this time each party also had the opportunity to
order food. All the participants signed an informed consent sheet for the study as well as for
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being audio recorded which was explained thoroughly by the primary investigator who also
answered any questions the participants had.
After the aforementioned process was completed, the primary investigator began the
interview. In depth interviews that lasted at least an hour but not longer than two hours were
conducted and recorded by the primary investigator on a cell phone recording app. There were
four primary questions (these questions are listed in the measures section) in the interviews
which also yielded follow up questions. The primary investigator let each participant talk and
divulge into various areas and opinions/thoughts, but was mindful to keep the overall
conversation on track and related to the Deepwater Horizon and the aftermath thereof. If the
participant ordered food or drinks or wanted to use the bathroom facilities at the location, breaks
were allotted for those purposes. Most of the interviews conducted in this research study
consisted of at least one break.
Upon completion of the interview, the primary investigator thanked the participants for
sharing their time and answering the questions provided. Later the primary researcher transcribed
the responses, which can be found in the results section. The transcribed interviews were coded
by the primary researcher using a code book available in the appendix section. Codes were
created by finding a generalizable trend first or sequence of themes that consistently fell in line
with one of the image repair strategies, for example not being truly regretful would fall under the
mortification strategy. After the generalizable trend was identified, a more in depth explanation
of what the trend was and meant was deduced. Finally, the actual quote from the participant was
presented. All of these three components were best created and presented in tables as previously
noted.
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The participants were not compensated for participating nor did they incur any costs to
participate in the study; furthermore, participation was completely anonymous and the captains
were only referred to as participant followed by their number. This study had no identifying
information for any of the guides who participated.
A similar study from 2015 titled “Crisis Communication and Celebrity Scandal: An
Experiment on Response Strategies” also explored Image Repair Theory and crisis response
strategies. In the study, the primary investigator used Qualtrics to gather the pertinent data, but
because this was a qualitative study that was guided by the philosophical perspective of
ontology, interviews were deemed the best data gathering method. Another reason that
interviews were chosen for this study was because they easily generate follow up questions and
dialogue, in this case follow up questions and comments were important because of the insights
and experiences of the guides.
Measures
The study used an inductive approach to test the research questions. The participants were
asked a number of questions, which were then coded and used to answer the research questions.
The initial questioning also yielded follow up questions. The following is a list of the four main
questions asked by the primary investigator:


What do you think about the length of time that it took BP to respond to the spill?



What do you think about the roles of the IGFA, CCA and FWC in the aftermath of the
spill?



Do you feel that BP acted with the interests of fisherman in mind in the aftermath of the
spill?
16



How was the fishing impacted by the spill, was it more seen in specific species that you
target or a broad effect on the environment?

The participants’ responses were analyzed under the five strategies of Image Repair Theory;
this analysis can be found in the results section with the associated code book and/or tables
available in the appendices section. These five strategies are denial, evasion of responsibility,
reducing offensiveness, corrective action and mortification.
The first strategy, denial, contains two types: simple denial (I/ we didn’t do it) and shifting
the blame. The second strategy, evasion of responsibility, has four types: provocation,
defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Reducing offensiveness has six components:
bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack the accuser, and compensation.
The fourth strategy, corrective action, is not broken down into subcategories. Rather, this is the
organization’s attempt to fix the problem, solve the problem, or both. The fifth and final strategy
of Benoit’s typology is mortification. Mortification takes place when everyone involved
apologizes for the crisis (Arendt, LaFleche & Limperopulos, 2017).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Results
A total of eleven in depth interviews with inshore charter fishing guides in the Tampa
Bay Area which lasted at least one hour but not longer than two hours, were recorded,
transcribed and put into a code book guided by Image Repair Theory. The following is the data
that was yielded from the procedures. .
In regards to RQ1: “How do the participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the
aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill?” the interviews yielded the answer that the
responses from BP were too slow, unorganized and overall not appropriate to address the
disaster. Additionally, while the guides felt that BP was right to compensate those who were
impacted by the spill, overall BP was insincere in their responses and the company was viewed
as bungling.
In regards to RQ 2: “What response strategies do participants feel should be used in
future spills?” The interviews found that the captains felt that oil companies should use
mortification and be clearly regretful for their actions, have clear corrective action plans laid out
to deal with these situations and reduce offensiveness (the use of payouts to those effected as
well as investing in the environment should be used but there should be a vetting process).
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Analysis
BP employed all five strategies of Image Repair Theory. Corrective action had to be
employed in order to clean up the spill, but the use of chemical dispersants and the lack of a real
plan of action again negatively impacted the company. Reducing offensiveness was a strategy
that was used and had positive impacts; however it was also viewed negatively as time wore on.
BP didn’t vet people as they should’ve been , so what was once viewed as fairly compensating
those who were negatively impacted by the disaster came to be viewed as throwing money at
everyone and everything in order to make it all go away. Finally mortification was something
that BP failed to properly employ as well; it was a failed attempt at appearing mortified and truly
regretful for what happened.
The following are quotes from participants regarding some of the response strategies used:
Corrective action
“My take on all of that… the dispersants… is that we may all die from what they did. They threw
untested stuff in our water” - Participant six
“I’m assuming that most of the oil sunk to great depths and was dispersed.” “I don’t know what
the impact of that was” - Participant four
These quote show dissatisfaction with how BP responded to the spill as far as clean-up efforts in
corrective action.
Reducing offensiveness,
“The compensation was irresponsible, I feel like people who weren’t really affected were
compensated”- Participant 10
19

“It seemed a little gimmicky to me, kind of like, “oops, let’s fix this, let’s spend some money and
try to get everyone back on our side”- Participant 11
These quotes show how disingenuous participants felt that the payouts that BP used as a form of
reducing offensiveness were
Denial
“They didn’t want to let everyone know that there were millions of gallons spilling” – Participant
10
“Yeah I definitely saw denial there” – Participant 11
These quotes show that participants felt that BP used denial as a response strategy after the spill
Evasion of responsibility
“I feel like they shifted the blame to other parties” – Participant one
“I think there was blame being shifted to the blowout preventer, the manufacturer” – Participant
10
These quotes regarding evasion of responsibility show that participants felt that BP didn’t take
responsibility for the spill
Mortification
BP said they cared, but they didn’t”, - Participant two
“They were more worried about themselves”.
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“I felt that it wasn’t sincere and that they didn’t care as much about the environment as they were
trying to advertise” – Participant seven
These quotes demonstrate how participants felt that BP wasn’t truly regretful and mortified by
what happened
Other salient quotes:
“They didn’t give a shit about us, they were making millions and million and billions of dollars”
– Participant two
“They were negligent to allow for there to not be a plan there” – Participant three
“I wasn’t listening to them because I didn’t trust them to begin with. They’re the ones that
caused the problem to begin with, and with everything they said nothing was happening so I had
no trust or belief in what they were saying” – Participant three
“I think fishermen were forgotten and that they acted in their own interests.”
“Waitresses and mechanics who weren’t effected got $50,000 checks” - Participant seven

All of these quotes demonstrate that BP bungled the handling of the spill, from not having a plan,
to appearing untrustworthy and uncaring.
As an aside to what was learned through the research questions regarding Image Repair
Theory, the guides felt that action plans should include working with conservation organizations
before a spill ever even happens. Additionally it was found that in the aftermath of an oil spill,
guides would hope to see every organization that has anything to do with fishing, from
conservation organizations to record keeping organizations and law enforcement organizations to
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step up and lend a hand in recovery efforts and to aid guides, fisherman and the environment in
whatever way they can.
An additional finding of the study was that guides responded positively in regards to the
possibility of greater representation and a coalition of angler driven organizations to help guides
and the environment in times of need. While there was support for the aforementioned
organization(s) there was an air of cynicism as the guides expressed that it would be a nearly
impossible task to accomplish.
Another result that the study found was that the fishing in Tampa Bay was largely
unaffected by the spill, some respondents even said that the fishing was fantastic and that they
saw no changes at all. Tampa didn’t have oil washing up on the shores of local beaches; further
research should be conducted from areas that had widespread oil wash-ups to see how the fishing
and environment was impacted there.
In sum, BP took far too long to respond to the spill and participants felt that they were not
prepared whatsoever to handle a disaster scenario, BP’s responses were not sincere and were a
poor attempt to save face in the wake of negligence (especially in denial, evasion of
responsibility and mortification), even in the physical actions of corrective action, the use of
dispersants was a point of major concern for the guides. The use of these chemicals in the water
made many guides fearful that they could have long term health effects for the ocean. The use of
dispersants was worrisome to guides as well because they were concerned that future generations
wouldn’t be able to have to same fishing opportunities as they did as a result of possible damage
done by the chemicals to the ecosystem, especially future fish stocks.

22

CHAPTER FIVE:
Discussions and Conclusion

The most significant findings of this study were the answers to RQ 1, how do the
participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill? And RQ 2, what response strategies do participants feel should be used in future spills?
The majority of the captains felt that BP’s image repair responses were inadequate in alleviating
the situation following the Deepwater Horizon disaster and also that in the future of oil spills oil
companies should be clearly and genuinely mortified and have clear and decisive plans for
correcting the situation as well as alleviating the effects of said spill on the pertinent publics.
BP should have refrained from using certain response strategies and used others
differently. The use of denial and evasion of responsibility greatly hurt BP; these were strategies
that should not have been used, as they made the company look seedy, dishonest and
unperturbed by the disaster. If BP had not used denial and evasion of responsibility but rather
took ownership of the spill from the beginning as well as appearing to be truly mortified rather
than feigning regret, they would’ve been perceived less negatively. Additionally, having a clear
and concise plan of action (corrective action) for clean-up – specifically taking measures to stop
the spill rather than letting it spill for 84 days and doing a better job of vetting people to make
sure that only those who were actually impacted by the spill received payments (reducing
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offensiveness), then they would have been perceived more favorably. Essentially, choosing the
right responses at the right times would have helped BP.
Image Repair Theory and its utility and applications were at the heart of this study. This
study added to the extensive and well documented body of literature on the theory and l served
as a case study of its application. The Deepwater Horizon spill was the worst oil spill in U.S.
history and surely will not be the last. Image Repair Theory’s application and the insights gained
from the interviews should be carefully examined and considered for use in the event of future
spills. Image Repair Theory can be thought of as a guide book of what an organization in crisis
should do, in the case of BP and the Deepwater Horizon; it can be looked at as a guide book of
what not to do as an organization in crisis. BP bungled the response to the spill, the strategies in
Image Repair Theory have been laid out and there was ample literature as well as success stories
of organizations using the strategies therein in times of crisis, yet BP either used responses they
shouldn’t have or used responses in a poor fashion. As a result of BP’s failure to appropriately
respond to the spill, the environment suffered, jobs and the economy suffered and they were
viewed very negatively. From boycotts to popular culture mocking the organization and groups
of very dissatisfied stakeholders, BP got hit with a firestorm of criticism and negative publicity.
The feedback from the participants in this study should be taken seriously and referenced
by future organizations in both public and private sectors. This is because guides are the eyes and
ears on the water, nearly all of the guides that were interviewed in this study spend at least 300
days on the water per year. Guides make their living through fishing and being out in the
environment, if they’re not, then they’re not making money. It is a likely assertion to say that of
those not in the scientific field, no one is more in tune with what is happening in the water and
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marine environments than charter fishing guides, especially in Florida, a state surrounded by
water on three sides.
If an organization or even a government agency or official can adopt these image repair
strategies, use them properly and learn from this and other research that presently exists, then
when they inevitably face a crisis they will be able to navigate it and come out on the other side
without having their image completely destroyed. Again, this study made no hypotheses and
didn’t claim to try and change policy or change the way that Image Repair Theory is studied, it
just brought to light new information. Whether or not this information is referenced and put to
use is in the hands of the reader.
The findings of this study added to the current body of research about the BP oil spill and
that of Image Repair Theory, but it should also be viewed as opening the door for future research
about guides, image repair and oil spills. This study didn’t make any assumptions nor did it have
a hypothesis, it merely presented the thoughts and opinions of an underrepresented group of
stakeholders on an issue. These stakeholders are a very influential group and their intimate
knowledge of the topic as well as insights that have not yet been considered in previous research
studies. There has been much biological research about this event, but the social science research
is lacking – the arena of the impacts that it had on guides just isn’t there. The interviewees did
indicate that they wanted to see greater connection between science and those who make their
livings on the water as well as a larger role of conservation based organizations; this study could
perhaps help make inroads there.
In conclusion, the insights and opinions of guides are very important when it comes to
environmental issues, specifically oil spills as they tend to be catastrophic events that can have
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long lasting impacts on an ecosystem. Unfortunately, the literature that currently exists grossly
under represents them despite the fact that they’re the eyes and ears on the water when it comes
to environmental defense. Policies of both public and private entities as well as their responses to
environmental disasters should consider them. This study provided real data from individuals
and their businesses that were directly impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Given the
amount of oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico one could argue that it isn’t a matter of if another spill
happens, but when. Before the next spill occurs, the primary investigator suggests that policy
makers survey charter captains and their associated organizations in order to gain a better idea of
the course of action that they should take with oil companies in the wake of future disasters.
Future considerations should be made to the various limitations of the study. The sample
could have been expanded to include female guides as well as other races and ethnicities (every
guide that was interviewed was a white male). Eleven interviews were conducted; more
interviews could provide more data. The results of this study were not generalizable because of
the small sample size, they are only generalizable among the small sample that was collected in
this study, and a random sample was not used.
As stated before, Tampa Bay didn’t see oil washing up on area beaches, this study could
be easily replicated with other captains in other Gulf Coast regions and states who were more
impacted by the spill and did see oil wash-ups, such as Louisiana and Texas. Tampa Bay was
impacted much less severely than other Gulf Coast states and even other parts of Florida. This
study should be conducted with these other captains to increase the sample size as well as
gathering a sample that was closer to the epicenter of the event. Future studies could investigate
offshore captains as this study only focused on inshore guides. Finally, the study was qualitative
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in nature; quantitative studies such as surveys should also be conducted to provide different sets
of data and more information.
However, directions for future research go beyond broadening the demographics or
changing the type of study from qualitative to quantitative. Situations beyond environmental
disasters should be examined in a similar fashion to how this study was conducted. Image Repair
Theory can be applied to both organizations and individuals, scandals from yesteryear such as
Enron and Tylenol to more recent events such as Bill Cosby and even athletes embroiled in
scandals involving performance enhancing drugs. Finally, the circumstances surrounding the
Primary Investigator such as being a graduate student limited the scope of the study. Future
research could examine crises responses in other countries and cultures to add more scholarship
to the current body of research.
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Appendix Two: Code Book

Denial Codes
Code

Explanation

Example

Failure to recognize older rigs
and practices

BP kept forging on ahead in a
form of cognitive dissonance
in that the same old rigs and
parts were deemed acceptable

“We’re not updating aged
pipelines and delivery vehicles
at nearly the pace they’re
being put in”
“Pipelines rupture, we know
this is going to happen”

Early denial of things being as
bad as they were

BP’s language essentially tried “They didn’t give a shit, they
to placate the situation by
were making millions and
denying the severity of the
million and billions of dollars”
spill and its impact

Willful denial of the danger of
a spill

BP was negligent in not
having a corrective action
strategy in place, this could’ve
resulted from a denial of the
possibility of catastrophic
failure

“I would say that it was
corporate negligence”

Denial of the need for a plan
of action in case of a spill

There seemed to be a
disconnect between the reality
of an aging oil rig and the
possibility of a disaster and
having a plan in place to deal
with that eventuality

“Someone screwed up and
there was negligence”
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Code

Explanation

Example

Didn’t deny their
role(s)/failures in the spill

BP owned up to losing their
rig and having this disaster
happen

“They did a good job of taking
responsibility”

Didn’t deny what was going
on

The magnitude of the spill
made it impossible to deny

“What are they going to tell
me? There’s still oil spilling
out, we all knew that, they had
cameras down there showing
it all day long”

Denial of safety issues

Some Gulf oil rigs are
dilapidated and look unkempt

“I’ve fished under those oil
platforms and I saw some
from BP that looked rusty,
unkempt and unsafe.”

Denial wasn’t used

Denial couldn’t be used
because of how large the
disaster was

“There was no denying it,
everyone could see it”

Denial of fault, muddled
responses

Didn’t have an open and
honest dialogue about the
incident. Passed the buck

“As time went on, I think that
they became more open and
said, “we’re working on it and
doing the best we can do”

Size of the problem

Initially BP used denial in
regards to how large the spill
was

“They didn’t want to let
everyone know that there were
millions of gallons spilling”

Some denial

BP didn’t completely deny the
spill or their role in it, but they
did try to shift some of the
blame away

“Yeah I definitely saw denial,
they weren’t exactly shunning
all the blame away but there
was something”
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Reducing Offensiveness Codes

Code
Felt disrespect from BP

Explanation
Put profits over the
environment, paid out money
but didn’t do enough

Example
“I really feel like they didn’t
take nearly the hit that the
environment took”

Made an effort to make things
better

Aside from cleaning up the
spill, BP tried to help those
who the spill impacted

“Yeah, I mean they tried, they
tried to reimburse you if you
lost business, but it was a pain
in the ass”

BP wasn’t trusted

Response messages weren’t
even worth listening to
because BP was seen as
disingenuous

“All the stuff you’d see on TV
was just brainwashing”

Responses weren’t relevant

Because oil didn’t directly
impact the Tampa Bay Area
directly, response strategies
were ignored

“It didn’t impact my business,
life goes on, I didn’t pay much
attention; but I do feel that
their payouts were huge”

Actions of BP were more
important than words

The messages from BP were
ignored, but the physical
actions, particularly the
payouts given by BP were
seen as good

“I think that it was pretty
generous and pretty fair”

Compensation was seen as
adequate, but overall BP was
seen as unmoved

“It sounded like those who
had real claims were fairly
compensated”

BP wasn’t serious in their
responses

“I honestly didn’t pay a whole
lot of attention to what they
were saying”

“If they went out of their way
to do more things and show
that they cared… I just didn’t
see them do that”
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Code
BP didn’t care about the
fishing community

Explanation
Lost compensation claims,
huge payouts to those who
were seen as undeserving

Example
“I think fisherman were
forgotten and that they acted
in their own interests”
“Waitresses and mechanics
who weren’t effected got
$50,000 checks
“I would put in these
applications for money and
then once or twice they lost it,
I received zero compensation”

BP’s response strategies for
reducing offensiveness were
viewed positively

Messages were ignored
because of the spills lack of
saliency. Compensation
viewed positively

“I’ll be honest with you; I
didn’t pay much attention to
what they were saying. I was
fishing and they paid me off”

Reducing offensiveness
response strategies were
irresponsible

Just throwing money around
when it could have been spent
in better ways

“The compensation was
irresponsible, I feel like
people who weren’t really
effected were compensated”
“I’m not criticizing them for
spending that money, but it
could’ve been better invested
in shoreline restoration”

BP acted slowly but once
things progressed, some
actions were viewed favorably

Plans and coordinated
messages took time to
organize, compensation was
fair

“It took a while to get the ball
rolling and for them to realize
that all hands on deck were
needed”
“I think that they did a decent
job with payouts and reducing
offensiveness”

BP wasn’t seen as genuine

Reducing offensiveness
response strategies were more
for show than anything else
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“It seemed a little gimmicky
to me, kind of like, “oops,
let’s fix this, let’s spend some
money and try to get everyone
back on our side”

Corrective Action Codes

Code

Explanation

Example

Need for better corrective
action responses

Slow responses to the spill, no
course of action.

“we should’ve had a plan in
place to take care of this”

Need long term and tried/true
solutions

Corrective action only to
alleviate the current situation

“I mean if you go out into the
Gulf right now, who knows
how much oil has settled on
the bottom”

Need more overall corrective
action

Actions didn’t go far enough

“I’m not really sure that they
did enough; I think they could
always do more”

Distrust of corrective actions
taken

Chemical dispersants being
used was seen as a negative
move by BP

“I’m assuming that most of
the oil sunk to great depths
and was dispersed.” “I don’t
know what the impact of that
was”.

Need faster response time

BP didn’t react fast enough to
the spill

“I definitely think that it was
lengthy, I feel like it was
devastating by the time that
anybody had really addressed
it and it was pretty bad”

Concern for future generations

Chemical dispersants seen as
dangerous

“we may all die from what
they did, they threw untested
stuff in our water”

Unprepared, no plans for spill

Did not seem ready to deal
with a spill

“It seemed like they didn’t
have a plan of action”

Adequate responses

Not fast enough but okay
response

“I think that they corrected
things as much as they could”

Acceptable responses

Actions were deemed
adequate

“I mean they spent a lot of
money and effort”

Had to limit damage

Not exactly sure of processes
involved in clean up

“You have to minimize the
damage as much as you can”
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Code

Explanation

Example

No real plan

Lack of quick action
endangered future fish stocks

“It seemed like there was no
direct plan of action right
away”
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Evasion of Responsibility Codes

Code

Explanation

Example

Shifted the blame

BP didn’t take responsibility
for what happened

“I feel like they shifted the
blame to other parties”

Didn’t issue real and
meaningful statements that
would tie them to the situation

BP tried to distance
themselves from what
happened by not addressing
the issue as best they could

“I mean it was all bullshit,
they told us what we wanted
to hear so that they could keep
doing what they were doing
before”

Didn’t adequately address the
spill in any fashion (physical
or otherwise)

BP tried to separate
themselves from the spill as
much as possible

“They just wanted it all to
disappear from our eyes and
from the media”

Focused attention on an
improperly installed piece of
equipment

BP wanted people to know
that a specific piece of
equipment installed by a third
party broke

“I do remember something
about the installation not being
quite right and I can’t
remember them saying that it
wasn’t a problem”

Through corrective action and
reducing offensiveness BP
took responsibility

By cleaning up the spill and
paying out millions to those
effected by the spill BP took
responsibility for their actions

“I think that they did a good
job of taking responsibility”

Adequately took responsibility After the spill BP did respond
for the spill
and owned it but not enough

“They were kind of blasé.”

Took adequate ownership of
the spill

Didn’t try to shift the blame,
but didn’t use enough
corrective action, which was
the true mark of ownership

“They took ownership and
responsibility but could have
done more”

Took responsibility for the
spill

Didn’t pass the buck at all

“I don’t think that I ever heard
them say, “it’s your fault not
ours”, it’s been a while but I
don’t seem to remember that”
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Code

Explanation

Example

BP owned the spill

BP didn’t try to put the blame
on anyone else

“I feel like they owned it. I
mean I didn’t think that they
pushed it on anyone else or
anything like that”

BP blamed someone else for
the disaster

BP put the blame on the
manufacturer of the blowout
preventer

“I think there was blame being
shifted to the blowout
preventer, the manufacturer”

Tried to create distance
between the company and the
disaster

Didn’t deny that the spill was
happening but tried to get
away from the disaster

“I think that BP was kind of
not shunning blame away, but
there was something”
“Like evasion of
responsibility”
“Right”
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Mortification Codes
Code
Expressed mortification that
was insincere

Explanation
BP’s guilt in the wake of the
spill was more for show than
anything else; to keep their
doors open

Example
“I feel that their primary focus
and concern was dollars”

BP wasn’t truly mortified at
all

BP said and did what was
necessary to make themselves
seem less like the “bad guy”

“BP said they cared, but they
didn’t”
“They were more worried
about themselves”

Mortification messages that
weren’t trusted

BP wasn’t trusted and their
messages fell on deaf ears

“I had no trust or belief in
what they were saying”

Unclear if BP was mortified or Because of the disorganization “I don’t really remember a
not
of response strategies, it was
specific, consistent message”
difficult to ascertain BP’s
intent and beliefs
“I think that they were really
only just trying to cover their
asses”

Mortified out of necessity

BP expressed regret, but they
were doing so to appease the
public

No mortification

BP didn’t seem to be mortified “It sounded like they were just
at all
doing their jobs and it was a
regular day”

BP didn’t care about the
effects of the spill

All of the messages and
dialogue mortification wise
were only for show

“I felt that it wasn’t sincere
and that they didn’t care as
much about the environment
as they were trying to
advertise”

BP was honestly mortified

A spill is the worst thing that
can happen to an oil company,
the magnitude of this spill
reinforced their mortification

“I think that they were pretty
well distressed, no oil
company wants a rig to blow
up”

Adequately mortified

The spill was an absolute
catastrophe and BP was
embarrassed and seemed
remorseful about it

“I think that they were pretty
mortified, with a spill that big,
how much more could they
have done?”
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Code
Not known for sure if BP was
in fact mortified or not

Explanation
There is no way to know for
sure if words mean what the
people saying them actually
mean

Example
“It’s a hard call, they may
have just put on a face”

Dishonestly mortified

Because of public reactions to
the spill BP used mortification
strategies

“It seemed like it may have
been a little bit forced or that
they got a slap on the wrist
and said, “I’m sorry”.”
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